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j Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BARBARA LYNN BUNCH 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (1992). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's order entitled, 
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice. The district court ordered 
that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice and on the 
merits and that defendant be allowed to request attorney fees. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in holding that Utah Code Ann. § 
30-1-4.5(2) (1989), requires one seeking a common law marriage to 
obtain an order to that effect within one year of the separation. 
2. Did the trial court err in not concluding that one's 
filing of a complaint within one year of the separation tolls the 
limiting language of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989). 
3. Is Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989) unconstitutional 
because it violates the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, section 11. 
4. Is Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989) unconstitutional 
because it violates one's right to due process under the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, section 7. 
5. Did the court err in ruling that defendant may seek 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 
Validity of marriage not solemnized 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting 
parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legal capable of entering a solemnized marriage 
under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; 
and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform 
and general reputation as husband and wife. 
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(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under 
this section must occur during the relationship described in 
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of 
that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this 
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the 
same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 
Courts open - Redress of injuries 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 
Due process of law 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues before the court center on whether the trial court 
properly applied the law in ruling that plaintiff's claim of a 
common law marriage must be dismissed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
30-1-4.5(2) (1989), and in ruling that defendant is entitled to ask 
for attorney fees pursuant to § 78-27-56 (1992). Questions of law 
are reviewed under a correctness of error standard, giving no 
deference to the trial court. Hales v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
854 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1993); Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 
P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing, and therefore, all issues presented in this 
case are conclusions of law of the trial court. Such conclusions 
are not entitled to deference and are reviewable for their 
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correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Barbara Lynn Bunch ("Bunch") filed a complaint 
against appellee Brian Lynn Englehorn ("Englehorn") alleging a 
common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1989) 
and asking for relief based on a marital relationship. Englehorn 
filed an answer. The matter came on for trial more than a year 
after Bunch and Englehorn separated. At trial, counsel for 
Englehorn moved the court to dismiss the action pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) because more than a year had elapsed since 
the parties' separation. The trial court granted Englehorn's 
motion on that basis. The court also ruled that Englehorn could 
ask for attorney fees pursxiant to § 78-27-56 (1992) on the basis 
that Bunch's complaint was filed in bad faith. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In this action, Bunch and Englehorn lived together for a 
significant period of time but never married. (Record on Appeal, p. 
000001.) After their separation on about August 18, 1990, (Record 
on Appeal, p. 000001.) Bunch filed a complaint against Englehorn 
alleging a common law marriage and praying for relief based on a 
marital relationship. (Record on Appeal, pp. 000001 - 000009.) The 
complaint was filed on May 16, 1991, within one year of the 
separation. (Record on Appeal, p. 000001.) However, the trial did 
not take place until June 2, 1993, beyond one year of the 
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separation. (Record on Appeal, p. 000090.) Bunch alleged in her 
complaint that the parties had a common law marriage pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (1989). They had an agreement to live 
together as man and wife. Further, both were adults capable of 
consenting to marriage and legally capable of marrying who had co-
habited, mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations, 
and who had held themselves out as husband and wife and acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. (Record on 
Appeal, pp. 000001-000002.) 
At trial, counsel for Englehorn moved the court to dismiss the 
action on the basis of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989) which 
provides that, "The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship described in 
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of 
that relationship." Englehorn argued that the parties' 
relationship ended on August 18, 1990; that it was now June 2, 
1993; and that no determination or establishment of a marriage had 
been obtained within one year of the separation. Therefore, the 
statute was, as a matter of law, not available to Bunch to pursue 
a common law marriage. (Record on Appeal, p. 000145.) The court 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice and on the merits on the 
basis of Englehorn's argument. It held that the court had no 
jurisdiction to grant Bunch a divorce from Englehorn pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1989) because the parties' relationship 
had ended over one year prior to trial. (Record on Appeal, pp. 
000150-000153.) The district court also ruled that Englehorn 
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could, if he desired, seek attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1992) on the basis that Bunch had filed her complaint 
in bad faith. (Record on Appeal, pp. 000153-000154.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in dismissing Bunch's complaint with 
prejudice and on the merits rather than allowing her an evidentiary 
hearing. The trial court also erred in ruling that Englehorn could 
ask for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992). 
The trial court applied the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-
4.5(2) ("section (2)") which appears to only allow a party one year 
after the separation to establish a common law marriage. As 
applied, section 30-1-4.5 is a statute of repose because it begins 
to run from an event, the separation of the parties, rather than 
from the date of an injury resulting in a cause of action. As 
such, section (2) violates Article I, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution which provides that our courts are open to everyone 
for injury done to their person, property, or reputation and shall 
provide them with a remedy by due course of law. Under the trial 
court's application, section (2) does not allow a party a 
sufficient opportunity to pursue a common law marriage claim. 
Section (2) also violates Article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution in that the short time period deprives Bunch of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law. Bunch was denied 
a hearing on her claim because it was not "established" within one 
year of the relationships termination, even though the claim had 
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been filed within one year. The time period is unfair and so 
violates her right to due process. The trial court should have 
found that Bunch had one year after the separation to file a 
complaint alleging a common law marriage. The trial court could 
have done that by holding that section (2) is a one year statue of 
limitations running from the time of the separation, and that by 
filing an action within that period, one tolls the requirement that 
the marriage relationship be established within one year of the 
separation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
AS APPLIED BY THE LOWER COURT 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 
IS A STATUTE OF REPOSE 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) provides for a common law 
marriage as follows: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or 
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a 
contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a 
solemnized marriage under the provisions of 
this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, 
and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have 
acquired a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife. 
Section 2 states that: 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship 
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described in Subsection (1), or within one year following 
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a 
marriage recognizable under this section may be 
manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same 
general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
The plain wording of Section (2) suggests that a common law 
marriage will only be recognized if all the elements of Section (1) 
are proven in court within one year after the separation of the 
parties. Viewed in this way, section (2) is a statute of repose 
rather than a statute of 1imitations. The Utah Supreme Court has 
distinguished the two: 
A statute of repose bars all actions after a specified 
period of time has run from the occurrence of some event 
other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to 
a cause of action. Besrry By and Through Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). 
A statute of limitations, on the other hand: 
. . . requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified 
period of time after a legal right has been violated or 
the remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived. Id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 is then a statute of repose because 
the time begins to run from the occurrence of an event, that being 
the separation of the parties, rather than from the date of an 
injury resulting in a cause of action. 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 
11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, section 11 of our Utah Constitution states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
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done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
and civil cause to which he is a party. 
In Berry, supra, at 674-76, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
Article I, section 11 in some detail. It stated: 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution is part of 
the Declaration of Rights. It declares that an 
individual shall have a right to a 'remedy by due course 
of law' for injury to 'person, property, or reputation. 
. . . . . . . . . 
The clear language of the section guarantees access to 
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on 
fairness and equity. A plain reading of section 11 also 
establishes that the framers of the Constitution intended 
that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of 
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual 
rights. A constitutional guarantee of access to the 
courthouse was not intended by the founders to be an 
empty gesture; individuals are also entitled to a remedy 
by 'due course of law' for injuries to 'person, property, 
or reputation.' 
Necessarily, the Legislature has great latitude in 
defining, changing, and modernizing the law, and in doing 
so may create new rules of law and abrogate old ones. 
Nevertheless, the basic purpose of Article I, section 11 
is to impose some limitation on that power for the 
benefit of those persons who are injured in their person, 
property or reputations since they are generally isolated 
in society, belong to no identifiable group, and rarely 
are able to rally the political process to their aid. 
(citations omitted) 
The court also pointed out that section 11 was more than a 
mere "philosophical statement." It was part of a Declaration of 
Rights and a "fundamental law of the State" which "makes them 
enforceable in a court of law." Ld. at 676. 
The court continued by saying that: 
. . . section 11 rights are not always paramount . . . 
and must be weighed against and harmonized with other 
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constitutional provisions, . . For example, the right to 
protection of a person's reputation must be accommodated 
to the right of others to speak freely. . . (In certain 
instances), "section 11 interests may, in some cases, 
have to yield to the power of the legislature to promote 
the public health, safety, morals and welfare. For 
example, the Legislature has abolished certain common law 
remedies for personal injuries and substituted other 
remedies pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act . . 
In sum, section 11 does not recede before every 
legislative enactment but neither may it be applied in a 
mechanical fashion to strike every statute with which 
there may be conflict. id. at 677, 680. (citations 
omitted) 
In that a statute of repose cuts off a person's access to the 
courts after a stated pejriod of time, it is in conflict with 
Article I, section 11 which provides for open access to the courts. 
The question is whether the statute of repose may be harmonized 
with Article I, section 11. It requires applying a two-part test 
which is set forth in Berry; 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy 'by due course of law' for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in value or other 
benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially 
comparable substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation, although the form of the 
substitute remedy may be different. 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may 
be justified only if there is a clear social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing 
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means 
for achieving the objective. Ld. at 680. (citations 
omitted) 
In Berry, the court struck down section 3 of the Utah Products 
Liability Act for not meeting the test. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) also fails to meet the test and 
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is unconstitutional. Section (2) requires one seeking to establish 
a common law marriage to do so within one year of the separation. 
Even with the changes in our court system, it is often difficult 
to push a case forward. One filing a complaint has no guarantee 
when it will ultimately be decided. Therefore, fate may determine 
the outcome of a common law marriage case. Many elements must be 
proven to establish a common law marriage and that may require a 
lengthy period of discovery. There may be difficulties serving a 
party. Motions by either side may cause significant delays. The 
court, counsel, or either party may be unavailable at a critical 
stage. For example, a common law marriage case may be set for 
trial eleven and one-half months from the date of separation only 
to be continued beyond the one year period due to illness. A plain 
reading of the statute would cause a dismissal in that instance. 
Another problem is that it generally takes time for parties 
involved in a marital type relationship to recover from the effects 
of a separation. Separations can be and often are very traumatic 
and even devastating. It is highly unlikely that a party at the 
end of a relationship will be thinking, "The relationship is over. 
I better file for a common law marriage." It often takes an 
extensive period for a party to reach the point of thinking clearly 
about his or her legal rights. A party may not even realize 
initially that a common law marriage is possible. The point is 
that the common law marriage statute simply does not provide people 
like Bunch with reasonable access to the courts as required by 
Article I, section 11. 
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Section (2) is only valid if it meets the two-part test 
discussed above. The initial question is whether Bunch has another 
remedy for establishing a common law marriage. Bunch does not in 
that her only means for establishing a common law marriage is by 
meeting the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. The best 
Bunch has been able to do is to file a separate action to try and 
obtain some concessions from Englehorn. Other claims have been 
lost that would have been available in a divorce action. 
The second question is whether the short period for 
establishing a common law marriage is justified because it 
eliminates a clear social or economic evil. The common law 
marriage statute appears to have the purpose of turning personal 
relationships into marriages. Bunch recognizes that a reasonable 
cut-off period is appropriate to prevent people from attempting to 
allege a common law marriage long after the relationship has ended, 
but she fails to see how the strict period now in place serves to 
curtail any social or economic evils. In passing the common law 
marriage statute, the Legislature made it possible for people 
living together to have the benefit of a marriage contract. The 
legislation helps protect people who have invested time, money and 
effort in building a relationship from being left "high and dry" by 
their partner. The problem is that the rapid time period required 
for bringing about the relief intended is arbitrary and 
unreasonable, as illustrated above. Bunch wonders how many 
potential marriages contemplated by the statute have been thwarted 
by the requirement of section (2). 
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In Horton v. Gold Miner's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094-95 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court noted that when a legislative 
objective: 
• . • can only be achieved at the expense of forcing an 
injured person to forego a legal remedy, the two 
objectives must be balanced against each other to 
determine which should prevail, and that balancing has 
been done by the open courts clause of the Utah 
Constitution," 
"Certainly there is a valid social interest in providing 
a time of repose—in wiping the slate clean and not 
allowing possible mistakes of the past to becloud an 
individual's life forever. The practice of wiping out 
past debts is an ancient one, rooted indeed, in Old 
Testament times. We do not believe that the open courts 
clause necessarily forbids forever and always such 
forgiveness of mistake. What it clearly does is make 
certain that periods of repose only be allowed when the 
possibility of injury and damage has become highly remote 
and unexpected. Short of that, injured persons are to be 
allowed their remedy. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 
7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, section 7, provides that, ". 
. . no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." The essentials of due process are: 
1) The existence of an appropriate tribunal; 2) inquiry 
into the merits of the question presented; 3) notice of 
the purpose of the inquiry; 4) opportunity to appear in 
person or by counsel; 5) fair opportunity to be heard; 
and 6) judgment rendered in the record thus made. State 
in Interest of L. G. W., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). 
In Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 657 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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Neither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a 
person a constitutional right or deprive such a person of 
a vested interest in property with any opportunity to be 
heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without 
due process of law. 
Many attempts have been made to further define 'due 
process' but they all resolve into the thought that a 
party shall have his day in court — that is each party 
shall have the right to a hearing before a competent 
court, with the privilege of being heard and introducing 
evidence to establish his cause or his defense, after 
which comes judgment upon the record thus made." 
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P-2d 199, 205-
06 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between the 
due process requirements in economic as opposed to non-economic 
regulatory statutes. It noted that economic regulatory statutes 
must simply be rationally based. These statutes have: 
. . . culminated in a rational basis test so tolerant 
that the substantive content of economic statutes rarely 
violates due process In contrast to the test 
used to determine the validity of the economic 
regulations involved in the foregoing cases, a 
termination of parental rights must be tested against a 
more stringent standard. 
Parental rights (are) fundamental for purposes of due 
process. . . . Utah's due process Clause requires a 
higher level of scrutiny than is exercised to determine 
the validity of economic regulation. By analogy to the 
tests employed in judging the validity of alleged 
infringements on other fundamental rights, we hold that 
the proponent of legislation infringing parental rights 
must show (1) a compelling state interest in the result 
to be achieved and (2) that the means adopted are 
narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose, 
(citations omitted) 
In this action, Bunch appeared in court on the day set for 
trial ready to proceed with her claim of a marriage relationship. 
The trial judge dismissed the matter with prejudice and on the 
merits because over a year had elapsed since the parties 
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separation• Bunch was precluded from having a hearing on her claim 
because of section (2). The section violated Bunch's right to due 
process by requiring her to establish a marital relationship within 
one year of her separation. That requirement is unfair for the 
reason outlined above. As the court stated in Berry, supra, at 
672, a statute of limitations " . . . must allow a reasonable time 
for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises." 
It is further submitted that in order to not violate due 
process, section (2) must promote a compelling state interest. The 
section pertains to the right to marry which has been held to be a 
"natural" right retained by the people. The Utah Supreme Court has 
said: 
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have 
declared that '[t]he freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential 
to the orderly purusit of happiness by free men.' 
In Re J. P., 648 P.2 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982). 
There is no compelling interest in requiring one to establish 
a marriage relationship within a year of the separation. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 30-1-4.5 AS A ONE YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Englehorn's argument that Bunch's complaint should be 
dismissed because a common law marriage was not established within 
one year of the separation was raised for the first time on the day 
of trial. The trial court reviewed the statute and applied its 
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plain meaning in ruling in Englehorn's favor. It is submitted that 
further reflection might have drawn the trial judge to the 
conclusion that section (2) provides for a one year period after 
the separation to file a complaint. It is submitted that this is 
the conclusion that should have been drawn. Again, section (2) 
states that a marriage must be established "during the relationship 
or within one year following the termination of the relationship." 
It leaves the impression that it is not enough to simply file a 
cause of action within one year, but requires that a determination 
of the marriage relationship be made by the court within that 
period. That is not reasonable, as illustrated above. What is 
reasonable is to say that one must file a cause of action within 
one year of the separation, and that in doing so one tolls the 
requirement of proving a common law marriage within that period. 
POINT V 
THIS IS NOT A PROPER 
CASE FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-27-56 (1992) provides that: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action as 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, 
except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but 
only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; 
or 
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(b) the court enters in the record the reason 
for not awarding fees under the provisions of 
Subsection (1). 
The court in this matter took no evidence and made no findings 
that Bunch filed her complaint in bad faith or that her complaint 
had no merit. The court simply dismissed Bunch's complaint with 
prejudice and on the merits on the basis the statute of limitations 
had run. Englehorn filed no counterclaim. It is the view of Bunch 
that once the complaint was dismissed Englehorn's answer went with 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted 
that the decision of the trial court to dismiss Bunch's complaint 
with prejudice and on the merits based on section (2) of Utah Code 
Ann. 30-1-4.5 was in err. The trial court should have found 
section (2) to be a one year statute of limitations from the time 
of the parties separation. Otherwise, section (2) must be 
interpreted as a statute of repose and unconstitutional for 
violating Article I, section 11 and Article I, section 7 of our 
Utah Constitution. The order of the trial court dismissing Bunch's 
complaint with prejudice should be reversed and the trial court 
instructed to set the matter for trial on Bunch's complaint and 
17 
Englehorn's answer, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
1994 
By: Stephen W. 
Attorney at La 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^ day of 
1994, I delivered two true and correct copy//6f the BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT BARBARA LYNN BUNCH: to Willard Bishop, Attorney for 
Appellee, 36 North 300 West, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah 84721-
0279. 
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FILED 
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' 93 OCT 8 Pfl 1 16 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. IRON COUNTY 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 ^ p p 
Attorney for Defendant BY 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN 
CONNECTION WITH MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 914900057 
Honorable J. Philip Eves 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, 
District Judge for trial on Wednesday, June 2, 1993. Plaintiff BARBARA LYNN BUNCH 
appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Floyd W. Holm. 
Defendant BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN also appeared personally, and was represented 
by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Floyd W. Holm, 
made an opening statement. Defendant's attorney, Mr. Willard R. Bishop, also made an 
opening statement. Following opening statement, counsel for Defendant, Willard R. 
Bishop, moved to dismiss based upon the provisions of UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as 
amended), asserting that based upon the opening statement of Plaintiff's counsel, which 
O O O l O o 
could be assumed to be true only for purposes of argument, the case should be 
dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits. Argument was had. After having 
questioned counsel and having reviewed Plaintiff's Verified Complaint for purposes of 
Defendant's oral motion to dismiss, the Court accepted -as true the following facts 
presented in Plaintiff's pleadings and oraLto be true for purposes of argument: and 
therefore, makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint was signed by counsel on February 20, 1991, was 
verified by Plaintiff on March 14, 1991, and was filed on May 16, 1991. 
2. Thereafter, Defendant Brian L Engelhorn was served with process on or 
about June 25, 1991. 
3. The parties began living together in March, 1979, in Brian Head, Iron 
County, Utah, and continued to live together until August 18, 1990. 
4. Following the filing and service of this action, and within one year of 
termination of the relationship Plaintiff failed to obtain any court or administrative order 
establishing that the relationship between the parties constituted a marriage which was 
not solemnized, arising out of a contract between two consenting parties who were 
capable of giving consent, were legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under 
the provisions of Chapter 1 of Title 30, Utah Code Annotated, who had cohabited, who 
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mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations, and who held themselves out 
as and acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
5. The Utah State Legislature adopted UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), in 
1987, which statute became effective in April or May of 1987. The exact effective date 
of this statute is not necessary to the Court's decision below. 
6. UCA 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), provides that the determination or 
establishment of a marriage under UCA 30-1 -4,5 (1953, as amended), must occur during 
the relationship described in UCA 30-1-4.5(1), or within one year following the 
termination of that relationship. Since the relationship ended August 18, 1990, and no 
determination or decree was obtained within one year, as a matter of law, the statute is 
not applicable. 
7. The cases cited hold that UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), cannot be 
applied retroactively, and on several occasions, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
invalidated and reversed rulings of trial courts which attempted to apply the statute 
retroactively. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . The provisions of UCA 30-1 -4.5 (1953, as amended), cannot be applied to 
the "relationship" of these parties to give rise to a valid, statutory unsolemnized marriage. 
3 
2. Since the effective date of UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), the Utah 
Court of Appeals has interpreted this statute in various reported cases, including Mattes 
v. Olearain. 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988); Lavton v. Lavton. 777 P.2d 504 (Utah App. 
1989); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991); and Van Per Stappn v. Van Per 
Stappn. 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah, App. 1991). 
3. This Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested 
by Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, in which Verified Complaint she seeks a divorce from 
Pefendant. 
4. Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed, with prejudice and upon the 
merits. 
5. Should Pefendant seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to the 
provisions of UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended), he should be permitted to do so in the 
form of an appropriate motion, in order to allow Plaintiff opportunity to respond. 
PATEP this T~ day of {0fj£ff6-o^ . 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Defendant 
FLOYD W. HOLM 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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FILED 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
'93 OCT 12 RH 10 36 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801)586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, 
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
) WITH PREJUDICE 
vs. ) 
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, ) Civil No. 914900057 
) Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, 
District Judge for non-jury trial on Wednesday, June 2, 1993. Plaintiff BARBARA LYNN 
BUNCH appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Floyd 
W. Holm. Defendant BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN also appeared personally, and was 
represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Opening statements were 
made. Following the opening statements, Defendant's counsel moved to dismiss the 
action, based upon the opening statement made by Plaintiff's counsel. Argument was 
BY 
IRON COUNTY 
00011,) 
had. The Court having considered argument, and having reviewed Plaintiff's pleadings 
and having accepted as true the pleadings and opening statement of counsel. The 
Court treats Defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment on 
undisputed facts as plead and stated upon such facts for purposes of argument in 
connection with its decision related to said motion to dismiss, although Defendant 
disputed certain of the allegations made by Plaintiff's counsel, and having made its 
findings of fact based upon said assumptions for the purposes of argument and 
disposition of the motion to dismiss made verbally by Plaintiff's counsel, and having 
entered its conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Complaint in this action should be and it hereby is, 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, for the reason that no court or 
administrative order was ever obtained establishing the parties' relationship as a 
marriage within the required time limits. 
2. That should Defendant desired to claim attorney fees pursuant to UCA 
78-27-56 (1953, as amended), he may do so through the filing of an appropriate motion, 
2 
with appropriate supporting affidavit and memorandum, in order to give Plaintiff ample 
opportunity to respond. 
DATED this . _ 
BY THE COURT: 
( - day of C^rX^Cc^ . 1993. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Defendant 
FLOYD W. HOLM 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
J. PHILIP EVES, District Judge 
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